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Abstract—The widespread deployment of IEEE 802.11 has
made it an attractive target for potential attackers. The latest
IEEE 802.11 standard has introduced encryption and authentica-
tion protocols that primarily address the issues of confidentiality
and access control. However, improving network availability in
the presence of misbehaving stations has not been addressed
in the standard. Existing research addresses the problem of
detecting misbehavior in scenarios without overlapping cells.
However, in real scenarios cells overlap, resulting in a challenging
environment for detecting misbehavior. The contribution of this
paper is the presentation and evaluation of a new method for
detecting misbehavior in this environment. This method is based
on an objective function that uses a broad range of symptoms.
Simulation results indicate that this new approach is very sensitive
to misbehaving stations in ultra dense networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
IEEE 802.11 based Wi-Fi networks have become an in-
tegral part of today’s indoor communication due to its ease
of deployment and cost efficiency. Its popularity and wider
acceptance has resulted in dense deployments in diverse envi-
ronments to cater for the huge traffic demands of end nodes.
The IEEE 802.11 protocols were designed with the as-
sumption that all stations that want to communicate would
follow specific predefined rules to transmit and receive data.
IEEE 802.11 in its current form includes security protocols
such as WEP, WPA, IEEE 802.11i and IEEE 802.11w that
use cryptographic checks for data and management frames
[1]. However, these protocols only deal with vulnerabilities
related to unauthorized access and confidentiality breaches. As
a consequence, the IEEE 802.11 standard has been criticized
for not including comprehensive security solutions to protect
all the entities within the network.
The basic medium access mechanism defined in the IEEE
802.11 standard [2] is the Distributed Coordination Function
(DCF). This mechanism is executed locally at each station
and is used for contention resolution. It employs the Carrier
Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA)
mechanism for contention coordination (i.e. minimizes col-
lisions) and random backoff to avoid collision (i.e. provides
equal fairness guarantees to each communicating stations).
Due to the characteristics of CSMA/CA, the Medium
Access Control (MAC) of IEEE 802.11 is very sensitive to
malicious attacks. A cheating station not complying with the
defined rules of engagement can improve its throughput and
latency at the expense of other stations by reducing the overall
throughput and fairness of the network [3]. Particularly for
the dense deployments encompassing numerous Overlapping
Basic Service Sets (OBSS) with asynchronous interference
(which is a critical factor in frame error rate performance), a
cheating station can have a cascading effect on neighboring
overlapping cells. While the malicious station can benefit
from a modified MAC, its excessive channel access can lower
the performance on stations present in the neighboring cells.
In order to tackle selfish behavior in dense deployments, it
is important to first employ a mechanism that helps in the
detection of malicious entities and then take the appropriate
countermeasures. This detection procedure can be instrumental
in countering the cascading performance degradation effect
that an adversary can induce in ultra dense networks.
A. Related work
Even through there is much research work on the detection
of greedy stations within a CSMA/CA based network, to the
best of our knowledge this is the first work that aims to perform
detection in ultra dense IEEE 802.11 networks. Even though
OBSS results in good coverage, the overlapping of numerous
Access Points (AP) and the use of common channel results
in an amplification of problems faced in traditional non-dense
networks [4].
An IEEE 802.11 station in infrastructure mode can attain
selfish behaviour by varying either the MAC layer or the
physical layer parameters. At the physical layer, increases
in the Carrier Sense Threshold (a parameter which indicates
the occupancy of the channel) and the transmit power could
benefit a station. In this paper, we address the MAC layer
manipulations.
A selfish station can manipulate the MAC layer parameters,
such as Contention Window (CW) size, Inter Frame Space
(IFS) [5] and the remaining transmission duration, responsible
for channel access which enable it to wait for a shorter time for
transmission than the legacy devices that behave according to
the defined rules (i.e. the device increases its chance of winning
the contention based channel access). While manipulations in
IFS are relatively easy to detect due to the constant behavioral
variations, the non-deterministic nature of the IEEE 802.11
MAC does not provide the receiver any information on the
transmitter’s backoff values and there is no method to detect
whether the station selfishly selected a shorter backoff time.
Various techniques have been proposed for the detection
of MAC misbehaving stations in IEEE 802.11 based Wi-Fi
networks. A common method to detect selfish behavior relies
on monitoring the overall network statistical information and
checking whether the expected results match the observed
results. The mode of detection in [6] and [7] is based on
extensive monitoring and analysis of shared frames by the AP
with the help of additional modules. A lightweight fair-share
detector is designed in [8] which exploits the fairness prop-
erty of the complete network. By identifying the number of
successful transmissions, the AP calculates the throughput of
each node and identifies a cheater based on highest throughput.
However, the authors have evaluated their proposed scheme for
a simple one cell scenario. Also, for the case of OBSS, other
parameters (such as Frame Error Rate and latency) could assist
in the anomaly detection. In [9] a new method is presented to
detect the malicious entity for IEEE 802.11 network using a
novel metric called Beacon Access Time (BAT). This scheme
was based on the principle that transmissions of beacons have
priority over any other transmission and, thus, can be used to
monitor the activity within WLAN network area from its AP
(i.e. not requiring any modification to legacy client stations). In
spite of the simplicity of BAT based scheme, the effectiveness
of this scheme was more evident when less than 10 stations
were communicating to an AP.
None of the above mentioned works and others in literature
address the problems of detecting misbehaviour in OBSS
environments.
B. Contributions
To address the OBSS scenario and the limitations of ex-
isting cheater detection mechanisms, in this paper we propose
a passive detection scheme that can be implemented on each
AP. Particularly for the cascading performance degradation in
OBSS scenario, APs must collaborate with neighboring APs to
evaluate the change of performance. Therefore, the proposed
scheme is made to operate at the network level as well as
the cell-local level. The proposed method detects misbehaving
nodes on the basis of passive observations at runtime without
incurring any extra overhead or modifications required in the
IEEE 802.11 MAC. The main contributions of this paper are:
• We address the problem of detecting selfish nodes
in ultra dense Wi-Fi environments, and propose a
simple, yet accurate, detecting algorithm. We define an
objective function that is used in the detection process.
• The proposed solution is based on the fact that ex-
istence of a selfish node causes global as well as
local variations (in overlapping cells). If significant
variation with respect to the default/reference objective
function is detected, the cheating selfish device can be
isolated and detected.
• In depth analysis and simulations results are provided
corresponding to an ultra dense environment where
different links experience variations in interference
(frame error). Results are also compared with other
metric used in literature, such as PDR [10] for the
non-OBSS case.
To the best of our knowledge, our proposal is the first AP-based
MAC misbehavior detecting solution for the challenging ultra
dense Wi-Fi environment. The same set of problems are also
expected to occur in other future ultra dense networks (such
as LoRa, Sigfox, IEEE 802.11ah, etc.).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II describes the basic features of IEEE 802.11 MAC and the
operations of a selfish station. Section III describes the metrics
used in the detection process. Section IV provides details of the
simulation environment. Section V, describes the performance
evaluation results along with an in-depth analysis. Finally,
conclusions and future work directions are presented.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly describe the basic features of
IEEE 802.11 MAC and methods used by misbehaving selfish
stations to gain unfair advantage. According to IEEE 802.11e
amendment, the Access Point (AP) broadcasts the default
values of the MAC parameters. A selfish node can manipulate
these parameters to increase its channel access opportunities
and unfairly gain more resource.
A. IEEE 802.11 MAC
The Enhanced Distributed Channel Access (EDCA) chan-
nel access mechanism of IEEE 802.11e standard extends the
former Distributed Channel Access (DCA) mechanism through
the generalization of the MAC parameters. These parameters
control the behavior and randomness of stations when access-
ing the channel.
DCF is a distributed access mechanism which is imple-
mented independently at each station and utilizes a binary
exponential backoff to react to collisions and physical carrier
sensing to prevents simultaneous transmissions. The physical
layer carrier sensing method, called Physical Clear Channel
Assessment (PHYCCA), is used to observe the channel con-
ditions before transmission (e.g. if the energy level detected
on the shared channel is greater than a predefined threshold, it
means that the channel is occupied and, thus, the transmitter
should abstain from transmission).
The DCF mechanism imposes an idle interval between
two consecutive frames, called Interframe Space (IFS). While
accessing the channel, one of the two situations can occur:
• If the channel is sensed idle by the intended transmitter
for a period of time greater or equal to a Distributed
Inter Frame Space (DIFS), it initiates transmission.
• If the channel is sensed busy during or after DIFS,
the station waits for a random backoff interval again
before sensing the channel.
Each station generates a random backoff time within a CW
size before attempting to transmit again. A slotted binary
exponential backoff interval is chosen in the range [0, CW-
1]. The CW starts with a minimum value of CWmin. After
each unsuccessful transmission, the CW value is doubled upto
the maximum CWmax. The relation between CWmin and
CWmax is given by:
CWmax = 2
m × CWmin (1)
where, m is the maximum increasing factor and takes a value
between 0 and 5.
If a station intending to transmit, detects the channel busy,
the backoff timer is frozen and resumed only when the channel
is detected idle for more than DIFS period. The backoff timer
is decreased while the channel is sensed idle. The random
backoff procedure is also followed between transmission of
two consecutive new transmissions from the same transmitter,
even if the channel is sensed idle.
Two techniques are used for frame transmission in DCF:
the basic two-way handshake (see Figure 1) and the optional
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Fig. 1: Frame transmission of basic handshake in IEEE 802.11
MAC with a misbehaving station.
TABLE I: Default DCF and EDCA parameters.
Parameters CWmin CWmax AIFSN TXOP limit
DCF aCWmin aCWmax 2
EDCA
AC_BK aCWmin aCWmax 7 0
AC_BE aCWmin aCWmax 3 0
AC_VI (aCWmin+1)2-1 aCWmin 2 3.008 ms
AC_VO (aCWmin+1)4-1 (aCWmin+1)2-1 2 1.504 ms
four-way handshake1. In two-way hand shake, an ACKnowl-
edgment (ACK) frame is transmitted by the successful recep-
tion of packet by the receiver after a period of time called
the Short Interframe Space (SIFS). It is a short interval used
to split transmissions belonging to a single dialogue (DATA-
ACK). A transmission with ACK not received is deemed a
collision by the transmitter. SIFS is assigned a value that
is shorter than DIFS so as to restrict stations to detect the
channel to be idle until the end of the ACK. For non-QoS
DCF operations, DIFS is related to the SIFS by the following
relation,
DIFS = AIFS = AIFSNDCF × σ + SIFS (2)
where, Arbitration Interframe Space (AIFS) is an EDCA
parameter which is similar to DIFS in DCF mechanism,
Arbitration Interframe Space Number (AIFSN) is used by a
station in order to determine the specific AIFS (Arbitration
Interframe Space) value for each of the four EDCA (Enhanced
Distributed Channel Access) classes. The AIFSN value is
transmitted by the AP to stations and its value must be greater
than or equal to 2 for all non-AP stations. σ corresponds to
the slot time.
EDCA mechanism builds on DCF scheme by provid-
ing differentiated transmission services for the support of
Quality of Service (QoS). Each frame arriving at the MAC
with defined priority is mapped into four Access Categories
(AC). These categories are, from the highest priority: Voice
(AC_VO), Video (AC_VI), Best effort (AC_BE), and Back-
ground (AC_BK). As highlighted in Table I, each category has
its own set of medium access parameters, which are responsi-
ble for traffic differentiation. Also, Transmission Opportunity
(TXOP) in EDCA defines a period of time for which a station
accessing the channel is allowed to transmit multiple frames
without using channel access procedure for all the frames.
The advantage of EDCA is that it guarantees the same
1In this paper, we explore the MAC misbehaviour when the default two-way
handshake mechanism is used.
Fig. 2: Impact of malicious device in dense deployments.
probability of channel access for all the stations intending to
transmit over the shared channel.
B. MAC misbehaviour models
As highlighted above, the DCF scheme does not provide
a centralized channel access mechanism and requires a co-
operative mode of operation by all the participating stations.
Hence, it is very vulnerable to malicious entities operating
over the shared medium. Particularly, for the case of dense
deployments, there is a need to find solutions that enable
detection of adversaries, so as that the performance of multiple
overlapping cells is not compromised. A selfish malicious
station, over the cost of other stations, can manipulate its MAC
parameters to improve channel access opportunities that can
result in unfair gain in shared resources (such as throughput,
latency and so on).
As indicated by Figure 2, a cheater can increase its
transmission rate and cause collisions at stations concurrently
receiving from other sources. This problem is further compli-
cated by the presence of numerous hidden stations in densely
co-located Wi-Fi cells, where transmitters might be unable
to hear transmissions by stations in neighboring BSS and
continue to retransmit frames up-till retry limit of the backoff
procedure. Thus, adding to the problem, these retransmissions
result in cascading effect, where a cheating device can cause a
wide spread impact in high density IEEE 802.11 deployments
from a single location. A greedy station can manipulate
the aforementioned DCF protocol parameters to increase the
probability of channel access:
• Using a smaller SIFS value in the optional four-
way handshaking mechanism could affect surrounding
neighbors to wait for longer periods by setting their
NAV to a longer value.
• When the channel is idle, the station can transmit in
a duration less than DIFS and upto SIFS.
• The station can reduce the back-off time by selecting a
small fixed contention window. This could be achieved
by lowering either the minimum contention window or
the maximum contention window size.
• For the AC, a station using voice/video can retain the
access of the shared medium by violating the TXOP
limit parameter and thus sending excessive frames
upon a single transmission.
In this paper, we address the DIFS and contention window
manipulations by the cheaters.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we first introduce the OBSS network
environment and terminologies used in presenting the proposed
scheme. Then we explain the basics of the misbehaviour
detection framework that compares network statistics with
respect to normal expected behaviour.
A. Ultra dense Wi-Fi network
We define an ultra dense network as a network in which
every cell overlaps with at-least one other cell. That is an
AP can hear beacon frames from at least one other AP. Ultra
dense networks are required to provide adequate bandwidth to
numerous Wi-Fi stations.
B. Network setting
In our analysis, we consider the scenario defined by the
Task Group 802.11ax (TGax) in [11], which consists of a
multi-floor residential building (see Figure 3). It includes 100
apartments and had the following specifications:
• 5 floors
• 2×10 apartments in
each floor
• Apartment size:
10m×10m×3m
• Building type: Res-
idential
• External wall type:
Concrete with win-
dows
Fig. 3: Layout of ultra
dense Wi-Fi deployment in
residential building.
A single AP was randomly placed within the walls of each
apartment. M (where M = 10) non-AP stations were placed
around each AP randomly. Varying number of BSS were
deployed and all cells used the same frequency channel. We
focus our study on the use of 2.4 GHz band because it is
more restricted in dense environments (due to only 3 non-
overlapping channels).
C. Evaluation metrics
Our scheme uses the following metrics.
1) Aggregate Throughput: is the sum of all successfully
received data frame at the destinations.
2) Fairness: Jain’s fairness index is the standard traditional
measure of network fairness. It is calculated by the following
expression [12]:
FJ =
(
n∑
i=1
βi)
2
n
n∑
i=1
β2i
(3)
where, βi is the normalized throughput (in kbps) of the i-th
flow and n is the number of competing connections. Absolute
fairness is attained when FJ = 1 (i.e. all stations get the
same data rate) and absolute unfairness is achieved when
FJ = 1/n. Jain’s fairness index is maximized when differences
of throughput among different flows minimizes.
3) Frame Error rate (FER): is calculated by:
FER = 1− FSR (4)
where FSR is the frame-success-ratio and is calculated by
counting the number of received Acknowledge2 (ACK) frames
and the transmitted data frames during a time window.
4) End-to-end-delay: is the average of all mean delays for
all non-AP stations. The mean delay includes the transmission,
queuing and contention delays for IEEE 802.11 frames. This
parameter that can only be counted at the non-AP station and
could be communicated to the AP using IEEE 802.11k Radio
Resource Management (RRM) frames.
5) Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR): is the ratio of actual
packet delivered to total packets sent. This parameter can be
predicted by an AP.
Evaluation of these metrics in a distributed network re-
quires additional feedback to the AP. We envisage that IEEE
802.11k amendment is a good candidate for supporting this.
D. Objective function
The goal of any cheating device in IEEE 802.11 network is
to gain unfair access and increase its performance at the cost of
other stations. Identifying malicious behaviour by evaluating
multiple metrics is more effective than using a single metric as
shown in Section V. These multiple metrics are incorporated
into a single value using an objective function based on our
previous work [13]3. In an ultra dense network, the symptoms
of malicious behaviour can be seen both locally (within a
cell and its immediate neighbours) and globally throughout
the entire network. As shown in Figure 4, the same objective
function is used at both levels. Formally, this objective function
for the network, called Network Objective Fuction (NOF) can
be represented as follows:
NOF =
ThroughputAgg × FJ
DelayAvg × FERAvg (5)
where, ThroughputAgg is the aggregated network wide
throughput4, FJ is the fairness in the network, DelayAvg is
the average end-to-end delay and FERAvg is the average FER
of all the links.
Individually, each AP also calculates its own objective
function by using cell statistics. The Local Objective Function
(LOF) is calculated by obtaining the average objective function
of neighboring overlapping cells (i.e. a cell that hears beacons
of OBSS generates the LOF) and the cell that includes a
cheating station.
All the APs in the network that employ the cheater detec-
tion schemes use this objective function to learn and adapt so
as to find the variations required for cheater detection.
2In IEEE 802.11, all successfully received frames are explicitly acknowl-
edged.
3The same objective function was used to evaluate the effectiveness of novel
AP-managed uplink transmit power control methods proposed to improve the
spatial reuse.
4Aggregate throughput only does not account for how resources are shared
among different clients.
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Fig. 4: Objective function calculations in the network.
E. Inter-AP communication
Even through the legacy IEEE 802.11 standard does not
specify the means by which two APs could communicate with
each other, there do exist propriety solutions by different ven-
dors. Also, in dense managed deployments, AP’s are generally
connected through a Distributed System (DS) which is a wired
network that enables inter-AP communication.
Also, an AP can independently estimate its own objective
function and announce that value in its beacon frames, e.g.
using beacon stuffing as suggested in [14].
IV. SIMULATION SETUP
The simulations were carried out using the NS-3 network
simulator with the Hybrid Building propagation loss model
[15]. NS-3 has been found by TGax to provide consistent
results [16] and provides the ability to trace cases of problems.
Enough simulations were run to achieve 95% confidence
intervals (a minimum of 12 runs for each case and the
simulation time was 35 seconds). The data rate used for
TABLE II: Physical and MAC layer parameters for simulation.
Parameter Values Parameter Values
Wireless Standard IEEE802.11n Packet size 1000 bytes
No. of BSS 32 No. of client per
AP
10
Frequency band 2.4 GHz Transmission
power of STA and
AP
16 dBm
Physical
transmission rate
MCS 7 for data frames,
MCS 0 for
Control/management
frames
Antenna gain 1 dB
Propagation loss
model
Hybrid buildings
propagation loss
Noise figure 7dB
Wall penetration
loss
12dB Fading model not used
Floor penetration
loss
17dB Auto Rate Fallback
(ARF)
not used
Guard interval Short Data preamble Short
Channel width 20MHz Beacon Interval 100ms
Aggregation not used RTS/CTS disabled
TABLE III: MAC layer parameters.
Parameter Cheating Stations Legacy Stations
CWmin 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 16
CWmax 64, 128, 256, 512 1024
DIFS(µs) 10, 19 28
Slot time (σ)(µs) 9 9
AIFSN 0, 1 2
each non-AP station is 3 Mbps guaranteeing saturation in
the scenarios addressed. We considered uplink transmission5,
where each non-AP station was in saturation condition6 (i.e.
stations always have frames to transmit).
The description of Physical and MAC layer parameters
used within our simulation are detailed in Table II. The MAC
layer parameters used by cheating devices in the ultra dense
Wi-Fi deployment are highlighted in Table III. For traffic
generation, we use Constant Bit Rate (CBR) UDP sources in
order to evaluate raw capacity at the MAC layer, without the
interference of the variations that produce the elastic behavior
of the different versions of TCP. CBR is one of the real-time
traffic category used by applications that request fixed amount
of bandwidth. CBR traffic offers a constant load.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we assess the effectiveness of our pro-
posed mechanism for cheater detection in ultra dense Wi-Fi
network. Each AP runs our detection algorithm. We compare
the performance of objective function and PDR calculation
in the presence of a cheating device with the case when no
cheater is operational. As highlighted below, the significance
of the proposed scheme is its operation at multiple levels of
the network.
A. Cheaters with CWmin manipulations
Following a DIFS period, stations willing to transmit a
frame will back off for a random number of time slots chosen
between 0 and the value of the contention window CW. The
default value of minimum CW, CWmin is 16. A cheater can
utilize lesser CWmin value than 16 which can reduce its
backoff and thus increase its access probability.
1) Single cheater in the network: For the cheater CWmin
value of 2, there is a more than 40% decrease in the objective
function of the BSS. In-order to avoid false reporting, in the
5We evaluate the performance over uplink transmissions because it is the
worst case in terms of contention.
6Saturation is used to explore maximum capacity.
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Fig. 6: One cheater per cell in the network reducing CWmin.
next phase, the BSS collects the LOF. Figure 5a indicates that
the OBSS are greatly impacted and Figure 11a shows that the
malicious device gains considerably. PDR results in Figure
5b show a consistent rise. However, the NOF for all CWmin
values do not show a decrease (e.g. for CWmin value of 2, it
decreases by 1.2% only). Thus, at the local level, the OBSS
can collaborate to detect a cheating station.
2) One cheater per cell: Next, we evaluate the case where
10% of the non-AP stations behave as cheaters by progres-
sively reducing the CWmin value. All APs in the network
collaborate together to calculate the NOF. Figure 6a show
near 50% decrease in network wide performance. Even though
Figure 6b shows the reduction in PDR, it is not as sensitive as
the NOF. As highlighted in Figure 11b, the cheating devices do
not gain extensive benefits. However, the detection mechanism
is able to detect multiple cheating stations.
B. Cheaters with CWmax manipulations
As mentioned in section II, AP and the well behaving
non-AP stations change the backoff after a frame loss. If
the selfish station used a small CWmax, its CW does not
become large and the CW is not increased even upon failure
of a transmission. However, as the values of CWmax used
for evaluation are greater than the CWmin, the collision
probability will be less and the cheaters will gain less from
CWmax misconfiguration.
1) Single cheater in the network: Even though the proposed
algorithm is less observant for CWmax manipulations, the
comparison of Figure 7a and 7b indicates the LOF progres-
sively decreases and is more observant than local PDR values.
Figure 11c also shows reduced throughput benefits for the
cheating device.
2) One cheater per cell: Figure 11c does not show a
considerable increase in average throughput of cheating sta-
tions. However, both NOF and PDR results in Figure 8
indicate variations that could indicate the presence of malicious
stations. Being persistent, the objective function results follow
a particular trend.
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Fig. 7: One cheater in the network reducing CWmax.
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Fig. 8: One cheater per cell in the network reducing CWmax.
C. Cheaters with DIFS manipulations
In the normal operations, the value of DIFS is set to the
default value of 28 µs. A cheating device can be able to attain
the access of the shared channel much more quickly if it can
reduce its DIFS value. In this way, the cheater can prioritize
its communication as compared to other stations. The smallest
inter frame space used in IEEE 802.11 is the SIFS and its
default value is 10 µs. The DIFS value for the cheater is
decreased from 28 µs to 10 µs by changing the AIFSN value
in Equation 2.
1) Single cheater in the network: Figure 9a indicates that
the LOF value decreases when the cheater’s DIFS is increased
because having a large DIFS reduces its priority of channel
access. For the cheater DIFS value of 10 µs, there is a more
than 12% decrease in the objective function of the BSS. As
indicated by Figure 9a, the LOF value for the particular case
indicates almost 9% decrease in OBSS performance. As com-
pared to Figure 9b, the objective function indicates significant
variations. Figure 11e shows that by DIFS manipulations, the
cheater can gain maximum benefits.
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Fig. 9: One cheater in the network reducing DIFS.
0
5
10
15
20
10 19
%
 D
ec
re
a
se
DIFS (µs)
(a) NOF.
0
1
2
3
10 19
%
 D
ec
re
a
se
DIFS (µs)
(b) Average network PDR.
Fig. 10: One cheater per cell in the network reducing DIFS.
2) One cheater per cell: As indicated by Figure 11f, greater
number is cheaters present in the network results in cheating
stations competing among them selves and there is n consider-
able increase in average throughput of cheaters, Interestingly,
as shown in Figure 10a, the NOF shows considerable decrease
when compared with a system where every station performs
normally. Also, the PDR values indicated in 10b are less
significant.
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Fig. 11: Average throughput of cheater(s).
VI. CONCLUSION
The proliferation of IEEE 802.11 networks has made
them an easy and attractive target for malicious devices to
misuse the network. In this paper, we address the problem
of detecting selfish stations in ultra dense Wi-Fi networks.
A new detection mechanism based on an objective function
is presented that uses per cell, neighboring cell and network
wide statistics. While comparing the cheating strategies, the
maximum variation in the objective function is seen for the
case when the cheater is employing a decreased CWmin.
However, maximum throughput benefits for the cheater was
achieved when changing the DIFS value. Overall, the proposed
scheme shows promising results in all cases. As compared to
PDR based detection methods, our results show that this new
mechanism is more sensitive. Future work includes develop-
ment of analytical models (to provide a theoretical basis for the
objective function heuristic presented in this paper), exploring
the performance of the proposed scheme for the optional four-
way handshake, and addressing the other cheater mechanisms.
Moreover, the proposed mechanism would be enhanced to
detect selfish/attacking APs within ultra dense network. There
are also reasons to expect that this approach will work well
for jammer detection.
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